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In the few decades since the Internet was opened to the public, common
website names have become a part of everyday discourse. These web addresses
have evolved from their original purpose-directing computers to their proper
destination'-and have assumed branded identities of their own. Amazon, Fa-
cebook, and Google are examples that quickly come to mind. It is difficult to
imagine that these corporate names likely would not receive the recognition
they do today without the useful services their websites provide. However,
they would carry even less meaning were it not for the Domain Name System
("DNS"), which translates these names and terms into the technical Internet
addresses that underlie each website (or "domain") name.' Today, these unique
domain names offer value to their owners and are easily recognized by every-
day Internet users?
Yet, while a user may associate a corporate name, such as Amazon, with its
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website's services, when seeking to actually access these websites, users must
be more formal when directing their computers to the desired website. For ex-
ample, users are able to access Amazon's website by entering
"http://www.amazon.com" into their browsers. Today's Internet browsing
software commonly allows users to drop the "www-dot" or the "http://," but
they must always include a final suffix: edu.com, .org, .net, and .edu-to name
a few. These suffixes represent what are known as "top level domains" and
serve to direct Internet traffic to the proper locations.'
As the naming system exists today, there are twenty-two "generic" top level
domains ("gTLDs").6 Only four of these are open to the general public for the
registration of domain names;7 one of them, .com, makes up the vast majority
of registered domain names.8 Recently, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), the organization that oversees the policies
and technical management of the DNS,9 has approved an unprecedented ex-
pansion of the number of gTLDs. 0 It was predicted that the new program
would create as many as 1,500 top level domains ("TLDs") over the next sev-
eral years that would compete with the popular .com." According to ICANN,
"[n]ew gTLDs are being introduced because the community has asked for
4 See discussion infra Part II.A.
5 See discussion infra Part II.A.
6 Internet domain names: What's in a gTLD?, ECONOMIST BLOG (Jan. 11, 2012, 9:16
PM), http://commcns.org/l0hA1WE. Additionally, there are several hundred two-letter,
country code top-level domains ("ccTLDs") that are based on the list of country codes des-
ignated in ISO-3166-1. ICANN, ICP-I: INTERNET DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND
DELEGATION (ccTLD ADMINISTRATION AND DELEGATION) (May 1999), available at
http://commcns.org/l02jaCG.
7 Internet domain names: What's in a gTLD?, supra note 6 (the remaining gTLDs are
reserved for specific users or communities, such as .edu for universities in the United States,
.gov for the U.S. government, and .xxx for the adult entertainment industry.).
8 MICHAEL L. KATZ, GREGORY L. ROSTON & THERESA SULLIVAN, AN ECONOMIC
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE EXPANSION OF GENERIC ToP-LEVEL DOMAIN NAMES,
fig. 1 (June 2010), available at http://commcns.org/W9cYql.
9 Welcome to ICANN!, ICANN, http://commcns.org/XhyrxD (last visited Nov. 10,
2012) ("[T]he Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) coordinates
the Domain Name System (DNS), Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, space allocation, proto-
col identifier assignment, generic (gTLD) and country code (ccTLD) Top-Level Domain
name system management, and root server system management functions.").
10 See Press Release, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., ICANN Approves
Historic Change to Internet's Domain Name System (June 20, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/SQQ37K.
II Internet domain names: What's in a gTLD?, supra note 6; Chris Sherman, What You
Need to Know About the New Top Level Domains, MARKETING LAND (Jan. 11, 2012, 7:01
PM), http://commcns.org/WKWBjo ("ICANN plans to limit the number of new gTLDs to
no more than 1,000 per year."); Elisa Cooper, New Top Level Domains Application Meter-
ing-Figure It Out ICANN!, CIRCLEID (Aug. 2, 2012, 2:53 PM),
http://commcns.org/Va3Ffr (these estimates were not far off, as ICANN received 1,930
applications, 1,409 of them unique).
[Vol. 21
Governmental Participation in DNS Management
them. The launch of the new [gTLD] program will allow for more innovation,
choice and change to the Internet's addressing system, now constrained by on-
ly [twenty-two] gTLDs."
'' 2
While ICANN believes that the expansion program will benefit Internet us-
ers, the decision to launch the program has been loudly criticized. 3 In a hearing
before a House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee, Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Jon Leibowitz said that the expansion
could be a "disaster."' 4 Moreover, an international coalition of over 150 trade
associations and major corporations petitioned the U.S. Department of Com-
merce to intervene and "persuade" ICANN to delay the launch of the gTLD
program.'5 Trade associations and the FTC argue that the program imposes
huge costs on trademark owners, does little to protect consumers from fraud,
and will exacerbate existing enforcement problems within ICANN itself.6
The Department of Commerce has a unique relationship with ICANN.
ICANN operates under the auspices of an agreement with the U.S. Department
of Commerce, known as the Affirmation of Commitments, whereby ICANN
has promised to act in the public interest and make DNS policy decisions in a
transparent, bottom-up consensus-driven process. 7 However, the Affirmation
is silent as to the Commerce Department's ability to overturn ICANN deci-
sions, 8 leaving some to argue that ICANN is accountable to no one."
12 ICANN, ICANN BOARD RATIONALES FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE LAUNCH OF THE NEW
GTLD PROGRAM 4 (2011), available at http://commcns.org/ IOCbQn6 (emphasis added).
13 See, e.g., David Rowan, It's Time to Place the Web in Safer Hands, WIRED UK (Jan.
12, 2012), http://commcns.org/U4doB8 (discussing high application fees, conflicts of inter-
est within ICANN, and the program's potential to create consumer confusion and vastly
increase cybersquatting).
14 Oversight of the Antitrust Enforcement Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 56 (2011) (statement of Chairman Jon Leibowitz, Fed. Trade Comm'n) ("[W]e are
very, very concerned that this rollout of the new gTLDs has the potential to be a disaster for
consumers and for businesses .... We see enormous costs here to consumers and businesses
and not a lot of benefit.").
15 Petition to Secretary John Bryson, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, from Coalition for Re-
sponsible Internet Domain Oversight (Nov. 10, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/XhyYzx.
16 See Letter from Chairman Jon Leibowitz, et al., Federal Trade Comm'n, to Stephen
D. Crocker, Chairman of the Bd. of Dirs., & Rod Beckstrom, President & CEO, Internet
Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos. 3-5 (Dec. 16, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/YbR107 [hereinafter Leibowitz Letter]; see also Letter from Robert D.
Liodice, President & CEO, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, to Rod Beckstrom, President, Inter-
net Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos. (Aug. 4, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/W9dipw.
17 AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS BY THE U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND THE INTERNET
CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND Nos. 3-4, 7-9 (2009) [hereinafter AFFIRMATION OF
COMMITMENTS], available at http://commcns.org/XH4AAS.
18 See AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 17 (providing no remedies for either
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This Comment argues that greater oversight of ICANN's decision-making is
necessary and that that role should be played by either the Department of
Commerce or, preferably, by a stronger Governmental Advisory Committee
within ICANN. Part II will examine the DNS and the creation of ICANN, both
of which helped to shape the controversy over the gTLD expansion program.
Part III will contrast the expansion of gTLDs while ICANN was under the De-
partment of Commerce's supervision with expansion since ICANN gained au-
tonomy through the Affirmation of Commitments. This Comment ultimately
concludes that, while ICANN was created to give the private sector control of
the DNS, the government should assume a stronger role in the multi-
stakeholder management of the DNS in order to ensure that management deci-
sions better reflect the public interest and that the DNS' public-facing steward,
ICANN, is held accountable for decisions that will impact the Internet's global
user base.
II. THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM AND HOW IT IS ADMINISTERED
The DNS was developed, in part, to simplify how Internet users navigate the
Internet. However, its administration has been mired in controversy and debate
since the mid-i 990s.
A. Creation of the Domain Name System
The Internet, as we know it today, consists of a network of networks, which
allows for the exchange of information by all connected devices, regardless of
whether they are laptops, servers, or smart phones." This transmission of in-
formation between devices is possible because all of the interconnected de-
vices utilize a common protocol and addressing scheme: TCP/IP. Each com-
puter connected to the Internet is assigned a unique series of numbers and
decimal points,"2 called an Internet Protocol Address ("IP Address").23 The
party if the Affirmation is breached); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Almost Free: An Anal-
ysis of ICANN's 'Affirmation of Commitments', 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 187,
203 (2011) [hereinafter Froomkin, Almost Free] ("Symbolism may indeed be the strongest
affirmative characteristic of the Affirmation: nothing in the Affirmation, nor anything else
ICANN has said on the subject, suggests that any of these promises are enforceable by the
U.S. Government, much less by an interested third party.").
19 See Froomkin, Almost Free, supra note 18, at 208-9.
20 JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 121 (2007).
21 Id. (explaining ."Transmission Control Protocol' and 'Internet Protocol"').
22 Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 194
(2000).
23 Under the most widely used version of Internet Protocol Addressing, a typical IP
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TCP/IP protocol ensures that the information packets traveling on the physical
layers of the Internet reach their intended destination, contain the information
requested, and return that information to the requesting device. 4 Thus, under
this system, if users want to access information located on another computer,
they would, in theory, direct their device to the IP Address of that computer. 25
However, having to remember an IP Address poses a difficult issue: remem-
bering a string of seemingly random numbers.26 A system that is easier to re-
member was needed.
In the early 1980s, local network administrators were able to name a device
connected to their network, such as a university's computer network, and link
that named device to its unique IP Address. 27 However, as networks intercon-
nected (into the Internet's modern network-of-networks) and the number of
connected devices grew, this naming system became unworkable.28 To address
this problem, leading researchers developed the DNS.29
The DNS functions as a tree-shaped hierarchy.3" The trunk or main branches
of the tree are the top-level domains.3 The TLDs are then subdivided into sec-
ond-level domains (forming branches off of the top level),32 which can be fur-
ther divided into third-level domains and beyond.3 Under the original plan, the
DNS had only seven gTLDs.34 The creators intended for users to select a top
level based upon their organizational purpose, such as .com for commercial
users or .edu for educational purposes [consider for explanatory purposes]." In
addition to the gTLDs, each country would have its own TLD domain based on
its two-letter country code.36 Finally, each TLD (or branch) would connect to
an authoritative root server system, which would "list[] the TLDs so that an
address appears as: 98.37.241.30. See, e.g., Improvement of Technical Management of In-
ternet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826, 8826 (proposed Feb. 20, 1998) [hereinafter
Green Paper].
24 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 20, at 122-23 (discussing the transmission of
digital information via "packets").
25 Id. at 121-22.
26 See Hines, supra note 1.
27 Weinberg, supra note 22, at 195.
28 Id.; PAUL MOCKAPETRIS, RFC 1034, DOMAIN NAMES--CONCEPTS AND FACILITIES §
2.1 (Nov. 1987), available at http://commcns.org/l02kRQk.
29 MOCKAPETRIS, supra note 28.
30 Id. §3.1 (explaining that within the tree-branch hierarchy, "[ejach node and leaf on
the tree corresponds to a resource set.").
31 J. POSTEL & J. REYNOLDS, RFC 920, DOMAIN REQUIREMENTS 1 (Oct. 1984), available
at http://commcns.org/U4ecGj.
32 Id. at 8.
33 Id. at 8-9; Weinberg, supra note 22, at 196.
34 Weinberg, supra note 22, at 196. The original gTLDs were .com, .net, .org, .edu,
.gov, .mil and .int. Id.
35 Id.
36 POSTEL & REYNOLDS, supra note 31, at 2.
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Internet message [could] be routed to its destination."37 Under this naming
scheme, "the labels that compose a domain name are printed or read left to
right, from the most specific (lowest, farthest from the root) to the least spe-
cific (highest, closest to the root)," thereby forming the Internet addresses
known today." The DNS thus created a single system for authoritatively link-
ing IP Addresses to terms consumers can remember and use with ease.39
For the DNS to work properly, all queries or searches to link a particular
name to a particular IP Number must be coordinated through a single authori-
tative system." If there were multiple root servers, searches for a particular
name could lead users to different IP Numbers, and ultimately provide the user
with the wrong information. Accordingly, the global Internet relies on a sin-
gle root server system. Additionally, and of equal importance to a properly
functioning system, the operating policies and procedures must be coherent
and determined in a responsible manner that serves the interests of the world-
wide Internet user base.
B. The Quandary over Management of the Domain Name System
The U.S. government was instrumental in funding much of the research that
led to the development of the Internet.42 Thus, throughout the 1980s and late
1990s, many of the operational aspects of this new communications tool were
performed by entities under contract with federal agencies.43 The initial fund-
ing, along with these contracts and agreements, seemingly gave the U.S. gov-
ernment defacto control over the DNS.44 However, as the number of users and
countries accessing the Internet began to grow, this management structure-
like the naming system that existed before the DNS-began to show signs of
37 Green Paper, supra note 23, at 8826.
38 MOCKAPETRIS, supra note 28, §3.1.
39 Green Paper, supra note 23, at 8826.
40 See ICANN, ICP-3: A UNIQUE, AUTHORITATIVE ROOT FOR THE DNS (July 9, 2001),
available at http://commcns.org/V8rErz.
41 See id. ("The presence of alternate public DNS roots can result in different answers
being given to the same DNS query issued from different computers on the Internet, de-
pending on whether the inquiring computer is programmed to access the authoritative root
or a particular one of the alternate roots.").
42 Green Paper, supra note 23, at 8826.
43 Id. For example, the task of allocating blocks of IP Addresses was performed by the
Stanford Research Institute under contract with the Department of Defense, and later by the
National Science Foundation. The task of registering second level domains within the TLDs
open to the public was done through a cooperative agreement between the National Science
Foundation and a company known as Network Solutions, Inc. See Weinberg, supra note 22,
at 198-99.
44 See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 43-45 (2000) [hereinafter Froomkin,
Wrong Turn].
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stress.45
Through an agreement with the National Science Foundation ("NSF"), a
Virginia company called Network Solutions, Inc. handled the registration of
new second-level domains within the .com, .org, .net, and .edu TLDs 6 Net-
work Solutions also assumed responsibility for the technical management of
the key root server system. 7 At the time the parties entered into the agreement,
the Internet was still a research tool, and, as such, NSF underwrote both the
upkeep costs of top-level databases and the expenses of new second-level reg-
istrations. '8 But as use of the Internet became more commercialized and more
users registered new domains, the burden of underwriting registrations became
prohibitive.49 Consequently, NSF amended its agreement with Network Solu-
tions, allowing the company to charge an annual fee of $50 per domain name."
These new fees, along with Network Solutions' restrictive domain name au-
thorization practices and its monopolistic hold over domain registration,
prompted the technical and legal communities to form the Internet Ad Hoc
Committee ("IAHC").5" The IAHC proposed a new framework for resolving
policy questions, adding new TLDs, and increasing competition in the registra-
tion of second-level domains. 2 But the IAHC proposals were widely criti-
cized.53 Critics saw the proposals as insular, hostile to the open nature of the
45 See Weinberg, supra note 22, at 199-200; see also Management of Internet Names
and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,742 (June 10, 1998) [hereinafter White Paper] (list-
ing the pressures exerted on the old management structure, which prompted the call for
change).
46 See White Paper, supra note 45, at 31,742; Weinberg, supra note 22, at 198-99
(summarizing the terms of the NSF and Network Solutions agreement).
47 See Weinberg, supra note 22, at 198-99. Note, however, that while Network Solu-
tions managed the technical functioning of the root server, policy decisions over IP address
distribution and DNS supervision were made by Dr. Jon Postel of the University of South-
ern California's Information Sciences Institute ("ISI"). Together, these functions are known
as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ("IANA"). Id. at 194, 198-99; see also White
Paper, supra note 45, at 31,741 (providing a short and comprehensive overview of IANA's
background).
48 See Weinberg, supra note 22, at 198-99.
49 Nick Wingfield, NSF Ends Internet Subsidy; Domain Names to Cost $50, INFO-
WORLD, Sept. 18, 1995, at 8 (noting that the "explosive growth in Internet domains" could
not be covered by NSF's subsidy); see also Request for Comments on the Registration and
Administration of Internet Domain Names, 62 Fed. Reg. 35,896, 35,896 (July 2, 1997)
[hereinafter Request for Comments, 1997] ("According to Internet Monthly Report, registra-
tion of domain names within .... com, .net, [and] .org has increased from approximately
400 per month in 1993 to as many as 70,000 per month in 1996."); Weinberg, supra note
22, at 200 (providing an overview of the pressures stemming from the expanding Internet).
50 See Weinberg, supra note 22, at, 200.
51 See id. at 200-01 (discussing, in more depth, the creation of the IAHC).
52 See id. at 201-02; see also Request for Comments, 1997, supra note 49, at 35,896
(noting the government's efforts to reach a consensus on the proposals and underlying is-
sues to determine what role, if any, it should play).
53 See Weinberg, supra note 22, at 202-204.
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Internet, and as an usurpation of control over the DNS.54
Reacting to this debate and recognizing the Internet as a "medium for com-
merce, education and communication," the U.S. government took steps to set-
tle the debate." The government assembled a working group comprised of rep-
resentatives from a range of federal agencies to study and resolve these struc-
tural issues. 6 On July 2, 1997, the working group, through the Department of
Commerce, issued a Request for Comments seeking public input on how the
DNS should be managed.57 In this notice, the federal government endorsed the
Internet's recent expansion through the private sector and the "consensus"
building approach to Internet policy development.58 The notice sought com-
ment on the creation of new gTLDs and proposed several intellectual property
dispute resolution mechanisms,59 but chiefly, it requested input on the proper
organizational framework for a privatized DNS.' The notice set forth the fol-
lowing principles to guide the new system: (i) encourage competition in the
domain name registration system; (ii) develop a "consensus-based self-
governing mechanism[]" under private sector leadership, with input from gov-
ernments; (iii) be flexible and acknowledge the inherently global nature of the
Internet; (iv) promote the "prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of conflicts"
between domain name registrants; and (v) adopt a new policy framework as
quickly as these issues permit.6
Although the notice promulgated specific and concrete principles to guide
the managing body, this surety dissipated when discussion turned towards how
the manager should be structured. Without offering clear recommendations, the
notice posed vague questions, such as whether there were any existing deci-
sion-making processes that could serve as models for the new DNS manager.62
The notice also solicited comment on the type and "makeup" of the entity that
would administer the DNS.6" And, pertinent to this Comment, the notice que-
54 Id. at 202-204.
55 See White Paper, supra note 45, at 31,742-44 (summarizing the proposals recom-
mended by Dr. Postel as well as the reasons for the Department of Commerce's involvement
in the DNS management transition).
56 Weinberg, supra note 22, at 204. Participants included representatives from the
"White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration, the Patent and Trademark Office, the [NSF], the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, [and] the Federal
Communications Commission." Id.
57 See generally Request for Comments, 1997, supra note 49.
58 Id. at 35,896.
59 Id. at 35,897.
60 Id.
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fned, "How should the transition to any new systems be accomplished?"'
During the notice's comment period, the Commerce Department received an
overwhelming response from the public.65 In response, the National Telecom-
munications and Information Administration ("NTIA") issued a Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making that outlined "the process by which the Federal govern-
ment [planned to] transfer management of the Internet DNS to a private not-
for-profit corporation."' This proposal is more commonly referred to as "the
Green Paper."67 The proposed rule suggested four principles for DNS man-
agement: stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, and represen-
tation reflecting the diversity of Internet users." The proposed rule also pre-
scribed specific actions to be taken, such as how the new corporation's board
of directors would be chosen and, notably, recommended adding only five new
gTLDs 9 The new corporation would assess the impact of new gTLDs on the
root system and then decide whether to create more gTLDs °
Not surprisingly, the Green Paper was met with strong resistance." Critics
attacked its recommendation to create new domains and proclaimed that the
government was extending its control by "dictating the details of the new sys-
tem" without adequately considering international interests.72 Following these
politically charged criticisms, NTIA abandoned Green Paper Rulemaking and
instead, NTIA issued a "Statement of Policy" known as the White Paper."
64 Id. at 35,897.
65 White Paper, supra note 45 ("During the [RFC] comment period, more than 430
comments were received, amounting to some 1500 pages.").
66 Green Paper, supra note 23, at 8826.
67 White Paper, supra note 45, at 31,741.
66 Green Paper, supra note 23, at 8826-27.
69 Id. at 8828-29. The proposal reserved the majority of the seats for technical individu-
als, such as those representing entities that distribute IP Numbers and representatives of
registries (entities that administer TLDs), and registrars (entities that register second-level
domains). Id. at 8828. Despite competing proposals (ranging from unbridled expansion to
extremely restricted), the number of new gTLDs was to be initially limited so that the tech-
nical, legal, and competitive effects of expansion could be studied. Id. at 8829.
70 Id. at 8829 ("Some believe that anyone should be allowed to create a [TLD] registry..
Others believe that such a system would be too chaotic... [and] it would be more diffi-
cult for trademark holders to protect their trademarks if they had to police a large number of
[TLDs].").
71 See Weinberg, supra note 22, at, 207 & n. 103 (citing responses from various groups
opposing the Green Paper's proposal); see e.g., Comments of Bell Atlantic Corp., Improve-
ment of Technical Mgmt. of Internet Names & Addresses, Docket No. 980212036-8036-01,
at I (Mar. 23, 1998), available at http://commcns.org/U4emgR ("The creation of up to five
new generic Top Level domains (gTLDs) is fundamentally flawed and ought to be reconsid-
ered.").
72 Developments in the Law-The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1574, 1666-
67 (1999).
73 Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 44, at 66; see also Weinberg, supra note 22, at
207-08 (noting that the White Paper backed away from its earlier proposal to implement five
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In the White Paper, the U.S. government acknowledged its desire to privat-
ize the DNS.74 Specifically, the United States would "recognize, by entering
into agreement with, and to seek international support for, a new, not-for-profit
corporation formed by private sector Internet stakeholders to administer policy
for the Internet names and address system."75 The White Paper adopted a more
hands-off approach and left much of the decision making up to the new corpo-
ration." Under the White Paper, the new corporation would: "(1) Set policy for
and direct allocation of IP Number blocks ... ; (2) Oversee operation of the
authoritative Internet root server system; (3) Oversee policy [for adding] new
TLDs to the root system; and (4) Coordinate . . other Internet technical pa-
rameters as needed . . . ."" The only actual restriction that the White Paper
placed on the new corporation was that it should be headquartered and incor-
porated in the United States."
C. ICANN and the Department of Commerce's Legal Relationship
The White Paper laid the foundation for what would become ICANN. How-
ever, before further examining ICANN's creation, it is worth noting the legal
circumstances surrounding ICANN's assumption of power over the DNS.
NTIA's White Paper, as discussed above, was simply a statement of policy.79 It
had no legally binding effect on the federal government.80 As Professor
Froomkin notes in his exhaustive history of the DNS and the creation of
ICANN:
One aspect of the legal history and pre-history of ICANN deserves special mention
before embarking on a detailed contractual history. Like the story of Sherlock
Holmes's dog that did not bark in the night, the ICANN story contains a telling ab-
sence. The ICANN story lacks a statute. At no time has Congress ever authorized
ICANN or the "privatization" of the DNS. [The Department of Commerce] has relied
on its general statutory authority to manage and to seek to "privatize" the DNS. As a
result, the critical legal documents are all contracts, memoranda of understanding, or
other bilateral agreements either between [the Department of Commerce) and contrac-
tors, or among government contractors.8'
Even though the Department of Commerce had no statutory or express legal
new TLDs); see generally White Paper, supra note 45.
74 White Paper, supra note 45, at 31,749.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 31,749-51.
77 Id. at 31,749.
78 Id. at 31,750.
79 Id. at 31,741.
80 Id. at 31,748 ("[T]his policy statement is not a substantive rule, does not contain
mandatory provisions and does not itself have the force and effect of law.").
81 Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 44, at 50-51 (footnote omitted).
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authority to privatize the DNS, the process moved forward.82 There are two
distinct agreements between the Department of Commerce and ICANN. The
first agreement transitioned management control of the DNS to ICANN,83
while the second was for the technical performance of the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority ("IANA") functions, which include, most importantly, dis-
tribution of IP Address numbers and processing administrative requests for
changes to the DNS root." While the goal was to transition much of the DNS
to the private sector, in practice these agreements provide for both a check on
and means of governmental oversight of ICANN's decisions. 5
1. The DNS Management Transmission
Shortly after the release of the White Paper, ICANN was formed in Califor-
nia as a "nonprofit public benefit corporation."86 Following a series of negotia-
tions and several amendments to ICANN's proposed bylaws,87 NTIA selected
ICANN as the DNS manager contemplated by the White Paper.
As a result, ICANN and the Department of Commerce entered into a Memo-
randum of Understanding ("MOU"), whereby ICANN and Commerce would
essentially perform a "study" on the transition of DNS management. 89
"[H]owever, the Commerce Department-ICANN [MOU] conveyed very sig-
nificant authority, because the means by which ICANN would "study" the fu-
ture privatization of the DNS was by acting as if the DNS were already privat-
ized."9 Nonetheless, the original MOU made no mention of what might hap-
pen to ICANN if the Commerce Department decided to terminate the agree-
82 In issuing the White Paper, the Department of Commerce relied on its general statu-
tory authority to promote commerce and its ability to engage in joint projects with nonprofit
organizations. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1525 (2006). The Department also relied on NTIA's
authority to coordinate executive branch telecommunication policies and standards, as well
as issue regulations to carry out its responsibilities. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 902(b)(2)(H),
904(c)(1) (2006); see also White Paper, supra note 45, at 31,741. However, as discussed, no
actual regulation ever issued.
83 See discussion infra Part II.C. I.
84 See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
85 At the present time however, only the IANA Functions Contract arguably fulfills this
purpose. See infra Part II.C. I (discussing the shortfalls of the Affirmation of Commitments).
86 ICANN, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION FOR INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES
AND Nos. (As REVISED) § 3 (Nov. 21, 1998), available at http://commcns.org/SQSQOv.
87 See Weinberg, supra note 22, at 210-11.
88 See generally MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE AND INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NOs. § II.B (1998) [hereinafter U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE & ICANN MOU], available at http://commcns.org/VMJtyC; see also
Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 44, at 84.
89 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & ICANN MOU, supra note 88, § II.B; see also Froomkin,
Wrong Turn, supra note 44, at 84.
90 Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 44, at 84.
20121
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
ment for any purpose.9'
It was not until almost a year later that the MOU was amended to specifi-
cally highlight that ICANN did not have sole authority over the DNS just yet.92
This modification provided that, should the Department of Commerce cease to
recognize ICANN, the Department would maintain a reversionary interest in
the contracts between ICANN and third parties, namely registries and regis-
trars.93 This provision was extremely important, as ICANN has no regulatory
powers and instead uses individual contracts to govern these DNS service pro-
viders." The amendment did not infringe on ICANN's flexibility to manage
the DNS, but it created an important constraint on the organization; if it failed
to act in the public interest, avenues were in place to ensure that ICANN's re-
sponsibilities would be smoothly transitioned to a new DNS manager.95
The MOU was continuously amended until 20069 when, at the expiration of
Amendment Six,97 the agreement between ICANN and the Department of
Commerce was rebranded as the "Joint Project Agreement" ("JPA"). 98
Throughout the span of both the MOU and the JPA, the arrangement was char-
acterized as a long-term transition process from public control of the DNS to
private control." Similarly, neither the MOU nor the JPA granted ICANN with
91 Cf U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & ICANN MOU, supra note 88 (making no mention of
reasons why the Department of Commerce might terminate the agreement).
92 See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND
INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND Nos. AMENDMENT I §§ 4-5 (1999), available at
http://commcns.org/I 0CdaX4 [hereinafter MOU AMENDMENT I ].
93 See id.; see also MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE AND INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND Nos. AMENDMENT 3 § IV
(2001), available at http://commcns.org/XH57CM ("If the DOC withdraws its recognition
of ICANN ... by terminating this MOU, ICANN agrees that it will assign to the DOC any
rights that ICANN has in all existing contracts with the registries and registrars."); Froom-
kin, Almost Free, supra note 18, at 188.
94 See Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 44, at 108; see also Froomkin, Almost Free,
supra note 18, at 206.
95 Had the Commerce Department ever replaced ICANN, the MOU's reversionary in-
terest provision would have ensured that service providers still honored their agreements
and provided continuous oversight of them, either by the Commerce Department or the De-
partment's new DNS management designee. Froomkin, Wrong Turn, supra note 44, at 108
("Were the U.S. government to transfer its recognition to another authority, the root servers
would be under no more legal obligation to recognize that new authority than they were to
recognize ICANN, but the move is all but certain.").
96 See ICANN's Major Agreements and Related Reports, ICANN,
http://commcns.org/l021rO2 (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (listing the various amendments
between November 1998 and September 2006).
97 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & ICANN MOU, supra note 88, § III.B (providing that
the agreement would terminate on September 30, 2006).
98 See generally JOINT PROJECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE
AND INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND Nos. (2006), available at
http://commcns.org/U4eH2Y; see also Froomkin, Almost Free, supra note 18, at 193.
99 See e.g., Press Release, Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., Statement on the Mid-
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complete authority over the DNS. Under the JPA, the Commerce Department
retained its ability to replace ICANN and to transfer ICANN's contractual in-
terests to a new DNS manager."
On September 30, 2009, the JPA was terminated with the signing of the Af-
firmation of Commitments by both ICANN and the Department of Com-
merce.'°' In effect, the Affirmation concluded the ten-year transition of the
DNS management to ICANN. 2 Under the Affirmation, both parties broadly
promised to ensure that decisions are made in the public interest, that the secu-
rity and stability of the DNS is preserved, that competition, consumer trust, and
choice are maintained, and that the international community participates in
DNS decision making. 3 In later provisions, each party individually affirmed
its dedication to fulfilling the above "commitments.'" Importantly, however,
the Affirmation lacks a way to ensure that the parties implement their com-
mitments.'05
While the Affirmation may have effectively ceded management to an unac-
countable ICANN, the Department of Commerce may still have one bargaining
chip left in order to ensure that ICANN keeps its promises.
2. The 1ANA Functions Contract
While ICANN may be in charge of DNS policy and management, it is the
IANA that keeps the DNS functioning. Generally, IANA performs three main
functions.' 6 IANA coordinates the assignment of technical protocol parame-
ters,' °7 allocates blocks of IP addresses to Regional Internet Registries,' and,
most relevantly, performs the administrative functions associated with man-
Term Review of the Joint Project Agreement (JPA) Between NTIA and ICANN (Apr. 2,
2008), available at http://commcns.org/WKXpF3 ("The JPA is a continuation of a series of
agreements between the Department and ICANN to facilitate the transition of the technical
coordination of the management functions related to the Internet domain name and address-
ing system (DNS) to the private sector.").
100 See Froomkin, Almost Free, supra note 18, at 193.
101 AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 17,$ 1.
102 Id.
103 Id. $ 3.
104 See e.g., id. 4, 6-9.
105 Froomkin, Almost Free, supra note 18, at 203 (discussing a lack of enforceability by
the Department of Commerce or any other interested party, as well as the "empty threat" of
terminating the Affirmation); cf AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 17.
106 See e.g., IANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT, ORDER No. 40SBNT057020 § 12.3 (2000),
available at http://commcns.org/VrHjmM [hereinafter IANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT, 2000].
107 Id.
108 Id. Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) are the non-profit organizations that are re-
sponsible for distributing IP Addresses on a regional level to Internet service providers and
local registries. There are five RIRs. See Glossary, ICANN, http://commcns.org/WKXubL
(last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
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agement of the root name server."° These root name server tasks are truly ad-
ministrative. The IANA Functions contractor can only receive and report on
requests to modify the root zone file:"' "This function, however, does not in-
clude authorizing modifications, additions, or deletions to the root zone file."'
This limitation persists as the Department of Commerce included it in the most
recent award of the IANA Functions contract to ICANN."2
The Department of Commerce has segregated IANA operations. With ad-
ministrative functions performed by one contractor, the actual root zone serv-
ers are maintained through a separate cooperative agreement between NTIA
and VeriSign, Inc."3 Like the IANA Functions contract, VeriSign's ability to
make changes is contractually limited: "While [VeriSign] continues to operate
the primary root server, it shall request written direction from an authorized
[U.S. Government] official before making or rejecting any modifications, addi-
tions or deletions to the root zone file.""4 This requirement is still in effect."'
Through the two IANA contracts, the Commerce Department maintains an
important check on the DNS-no change is actually made without governmen-
tal approval.
While VeriSign operates the root servers, it is ICANN who, since 2000, has
performed the IANA Functions Contract."6 Recognizing that the latest iteration
of the contract was set to expire in late 2011, NTIA issued a Notice of Inquiry
seeking public comment on ways to improve the IANA Functions Contract." 7
NTIA later issued a Further Notice of Inquiry, but this time sought input on a
109 IANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT, 2000, supra note 106.
110 Id.; IANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT, CONTRACT No. SA 1301-12-CN-0035 app. 1
(2012), available at http://commcns.org/Wj2BBe [hereinafter IANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT,
2012] (demonstrating how the IANA Functions Contractor processes change requests, pro-
vides them to NTIA for approval, and, once approved, how requests are passed on to the
technical Root Zone Maintainer to actually make the requested change).
I IANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT, 2000, supra note 106.
112 IANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT, 2012, supra note 110, § C.8. l.
113 Verisign Cooperative Agreement, NTIA, http://commcns.org/XhAFgz (last visited
Nov. 10, 2012) ("VeriSign manages the authoritative root zone file under the Cooperative
Agreement No. NCR 92-18742 with the United States Government. VeriSign's responsibili-
ties include editing the file to reflect recommended changes, publishing the file, and then
distributing the file to the root server operators.").
114 SPECIAL AWARD CONDITIONS NCR 92-18742, AMENDMENT 11, at 6 (1998), available
at http://commcns.org/V8sEMe.
1I5 See IANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT, 2012, supra note 1 10, § C.8. 1 ("This contract does
not alter the root zone file responsibilities as set forth in Amendment I I of the Cooperative
Agreement NCR-9218742 between the U.S. Department of Commerce and VeriSign, Inc...
."); see also Froomkin, Almost Free, supra note 18, at 203-04.
116 See IANA Functions Contract, NTIA, http://commcns.org/W9epWg (last visited Nov.
10, 2012) (listing every NTIA-ICANN contract and amendment since February 2000).
117 Notice of Inquiry, Request for Comments on the Internet Assigned Numbers Author-
ity (IANA) Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,569 (Feb. 25, 2011).
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draft statement of work for the contract." 8 NTIA's requests for comments
should be seen as a reminder to ICANN that the government is still an impor-
tant player in the DNS.
11. FREE TO DO WHAT IT WANTS? ICANN AND NEW GENERIC TOP
LEVEL DOMAINS
The creation of new TLDs has been a point of discussion since the early
days of the DNS privatization movement." 9 Furthermore, decisions relating to
how new gTLDs should be created have generally been contentious. 2 This
Part of the Comment examines how ICANN has and will continue to expand
the number of gTLDs under the MOU/JPA regime, as well as its recent deci-
sions under the Affirmation of Commitments.
A. A Measured and Purposeful Approach: gTLD Expansion under the MOU
and JPA
The year 2000 marked the first expansion of the gTLD space, when ICANN
initiated a "proof of concept program."'' This initial program only introduced
a select number of new gTLDs' 22 It was designed to test the flexibility of the
DNS and to assist ICANN in determining how future expansions should be
managed. 
2
The decision to implement this proof of concept expansion round closely
followed the Commerce Department's earlier recommendations. The White
Paper advised that "concern for the stability of the system suggests that expan-
118 Further Notice of Inquiry, The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Func-
tions, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,658 (June 14, 2011) [hereinafter IANA Further NOI].
119 See e.g., Weinberg, supra note 22, at 201 (discussing the IAHC's suggestion in 1996
to create 150 new gTLDs); see also Green Paper, supra note 23, at 8829 (recommending
that five new gTLDs be added while the new private sector DNS manager creates a policy
for gTLD creation); Competition, Consumer Trust and Consumer Choice Review, ICANN,
http://commcns.org/WKXF71 (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) ("ICANN will ensure that as it
contemplates expanding the top-level domain space, the various issues that are involved...
will be adequately addressed prior to implementation.").
120 See White Paper, supra note 45, at 31,741 (noting that NTIA received more than 650
comments in response to the Green Paper); see also ICANN Generic Top-Level Domains
(gTLD): Hearing before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1-2 (2011) [hereinafter ICANNgTLD Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chair, Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop.) (discussing po-
tential harms of the program and the motives behind it).
121 Background Information Regarding Previous New GTLD Application Rounds,






sion of gTLDs [should] proceed at a deliberate and controlled pace to allow for
evaluation of the impact of the new gTLDs ... ,"24 Additionally, the MOU be-
tween ICANN and the Commerce Department stated that the creation process
should take into account the impact of new gTLDs on the root server system,'25
the creation of minimum criteria for new gTLD registries, 26 the costs and ben-
efits to consumers,'27 and recommendations for protecting intellectual property
rights within new gTLDs 28
In 1999, ICANN's Domain Name Supporting Organization ("DNSO") 29 be-
gan the process of formulating recommendations for the creation of new
gTLDs 3 The DNSO formed a Working Group, which debated whether and
how new gTLDs should be created.' In October of 1999, the Working Group
achieved a rough consensus that, first, new gTLDs should be created and, sec-
ond, as a compromise position, that ICANN should authorize a limited number
of new gTLDs and evaluate their effect.' This consensus came at the expense
of competing proposals within the Working Group that called for a much lar-
ger expansion. Although these more expansive proposals were the most popu-
lar within the Working Group,'33 they were opposed by intellectual property
124 White Paper, supra note 45, at 31,746.




129 The DNSO was an ICANN-supporting organization created pursuant to ICANN's
original bylaws. See ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND Nos.
Art. VI § 3(a)(ii) (Nov. 6, 1998), available at http://commcns.org/10hEbOo. ("The [DNSO]
shall be composed of representatives from name registries and registrars of [TLDs], busi-
nesses and any other entities that are users of the Internet and others with legitimate interests
in these issues .... The [DNSO] shall.., make recommendations regarding TLDs, includ-
ing operation, assignment and management of the [DNS]."). In 2002, ICANN amended its
bylaws, eliminating the DNSO and replacing it with the Generic Names Supporting Organi-
zation ("GNSO"). See ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND
Nos. Art. X § 1 (Dec. 15, 2002), available at http://commcns.org/XhAZvR ("There shall be
a policy-development body known as the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO),
which shall be responsible for developing and recommending to the ICANN Board substan-
tive policies relating to generic top-level domains.").
13o ICANN, REPORT (PART ONE) OF WORKING GROUP C (NEW GTLDs) PRESENTED TO
NAMES COUNCIL (2000), available at http://commcns.org/U4fqkC. See also ICANN, MEET-
ING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN YOKOHAMA PRELIMINARY REPORT (July 16, 2000), available
at http://commcns.org/l0hEuc7 ("Whereas, the Names Council of the DNSO made a set of
recommendations to the Board on 18/19 April 2000, including the recommendation that the
Board establish a policy for the introduction of new gTLDs in a measured and responsible
manner ... ").
131 REPORT (PART ONE) OF WORKING GROUP C (NEW GTLDS) PRESENTED TO NAMES
COUNCIL, supra note 130.
132 Id.
133 See ICANN, INTERIM REPORT OF WORKING GROUP C OF THE DOMAIN NAME SUPPORT-
ING ORG., INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND Nos. (1999), available at
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holders.'34 They were also contrary to the White Paper's recommendation of a
"deliberate and controlled pace" for the introduction of new gTLDs.135
Shortly after the Working Group's consensus was announced, ICANN and
the Commerce Department amended the MOU, adding the provision giving
Commerce a reversionary interest in ICANN's contracts with registries and
registrars should the Department decide to recognize another non-profit to
oversee the DNS.'36 While it is unlikely that the reversionary language was
added to the MOU solely because of the debate over gTLD expansion within
the DNSO, it likely served as a reminder that ICANN did not have absolute
control over the DNS and that ICANN needed to abide by its MOU obliga-
tions. Ultimately, the Working Group stuck to the consensus position of a lim-
ited introduction of new gTLDs and recommended it to the DNSO.' 37 The
ICANN Board accepted the recommendation and, at its July 2000 meeting, the
Board announced that it would begin accepting applications for a limited num-
ber of new gTLDs in October 2000.138
At the close of the application window, forty-seven entities had applied for
the creation of a new TLD.'39 As part of its evaluation of viable TLDs, ICANN
explained, "[a]t this 'proof of concept' stage, the evaluation process was fo-
cused on identifying a fmite, relatively small number of strong applications
that could serve the purpose of this effort," which was to "evaluate the effects
on the DNS of additional TLDs [in a way that] would minimize to the extent
possible any possible disruption of or instability in the DNS .. .""' This ap-
proach was in line with the Commerce Department's recommendation in the
White Paper. 4'
As a result of the proof of concept program, ICANN "selected .info and .biz
for general use and .pro for professionals. Also added were .name for personal
Web sites, .museum for museums, .aero for airline groups and .coop for busi-
http://commcns.org/102mH3E [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT] ("For lack of a better sequence,
we have arranged the position papers in this interim report in descending order of their ex-
pressed support within the working group. That is, the position paper with the most endors-
ers from within the working group is placed first, and so on.").
134 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 133.
135 See White Paper, supra note 45, at 31,746.
136 MOU AMENDMENT 1, supra note 92, §§ 4-5.
137 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 133.
138 MEETING OF THE ICANN BOARD IN YOKOHAMA PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 130
("Resolved [00.46], that the Board hereby adopts the Names Council's recommendation that
a policy be established for the introduction of new TLDs in a measured and responsible
manner").
139 gTLD Background Information, supra note 121. The list of applications and sug-
gested TLDs varied widely. See TLD Applications Lodged, ICANN (Oct. 10, 2000),
http://commcns.org/VMKeYr.
140 gTLD Background Information, supra note 121.
141 White Paper, supra note 45, at 31,746.
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ness cooperatives.' 4 2 With no regulatory or independent legal authority over
the DNS, contracts known as Registry Agreements were negotiated and each
of these TLDs were added to the root.'43
In 2004, ICANN initiated a new expansion round, but this time restricted
applications to "sponsored TLDs."'" These specific TLDs have a sponsor that
represents a particular community served by the TLD 45 The purpose of the
sponsor is to carry out "delegated policy formulation responsibilities" over a
variety of matters regarding the TLD 46 Generally, only members of that spe-
cific community are allowed to register domains within the sponsored TLD 7
ICANN received ten applications during the 2004 round, 48 and approved five
new TLDs for negotiation: .tel, .post, .mobi, .travel and .jobs'49
Under the MOU/JPA regime, but outside of any formal application window,
ICANN selected two additional sponsored TLDs. 50 The first, .cat, was ap-
proved by ICANN in 2005.'' The .cat TLD seeks to promote the continuity of
the Catalan language.' 52 The second sponsored TLD that was approved by
ICANN under the MOU/JPA era, .asia, was approved in late 2006. 5"
As demonstrated by ICANN's selections, the creation of new TLDs was a
measured process while still under the Department of Commerce's watch. The
majority of new TLDs were created to be used by specific businesses or com-
142 Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Adult Websites and the Top-Level Domain De-
bate: ICANN's Adoption of .XXX Draws Adult-Industry Ire, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
527, 532 (2011) (discussing the 2000 round of gTLD expansion) (quoting Chris Gaither,
TECHNOLOGY; 7 New Domains Are Chosen To Join the Popular .com, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
17, 2000), http://commcns.org/l IChftH).
143 ICANN maintains an archive of expired Registry Agreements where initial agree-
ments from the proof of concept round can be viewed. Archived Registry Agreements,
ICANN (Aug. 19, 2012, 3:46 PM),
http://www.icann.org/en/about/agreements/registries/archive.
'4 gTLD Background Information, supra note 12 1.
"45 Glossary, GTLD REGISTRIES STAKEHOLDER GROUP (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://commcns.org/I02mX21.
146 Id.
147 See ICANN, .CAT REGISTRY AGREEMENT app. S (Sept. 23, 2005), available at
http://commcns.org/VrJxTi. Appendix S of the .cat Charter discusses the purpose of the dot-
cat TLD as to serve the needs of the Catalan language and restricts registration within the
dot-cat TLD to those utilizing the Catalan language or promoting Catalan culture. Id. at pt. I
& III. Examples of sponsored TLDs from the proof of concept round include .museum and
.aero. Sponsored TLDs, GTLD REGISTRIES STAKEHOLDER GROUP (Mar. 9, 2012),
http://commcns.org/I0hF751.
148 gTLD Background Information, supra note 12 1.
149 In the 2000 sTLD round, .tel and post were approved for negotiations. Id.
150 See 2005 Board Meetings, ICANN (Aug. 10, 2012), http://commcns.org/Xe I oKg.
151 Special Meeting of the Board I Preliminary Report, ICANN (Sept. 15, 2008),
http://commcns.org/13IJ41 X.
152 See Sponsored TLDs, supra note 147; see also discussion supra note 147.
153 Candace Lombardi, ICANN Approves '.asia' as Top-Level Domain, CNET NEWS
(Dec. 8, 2006, 2:08 PM), http://commcns.org/Wb0H61.
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munities of users, such as speakers of the Catalan language.'54 ICANN chose a
variety of different types of TLDs-both truly generic and limited-use rLDs-
which allowed it to expand consumer choice, to measure the effects of new
TLDs on the root system, and to monitor how the expansion affected intellec-
tual property holders. "' Unfortunately, once the Commerce Department's
oversight ended, and the possibility that the Department would hand ICANN's
responsibilities to another entity passed, ICANN's decision-making took a no-
table shift.
B. Controversy and More Controversy: gTLD Decisions Under the
Affirmation of Commitments
Since agreeing to the Affirmation of Commitments in 2009, ICANN has
made two major decisions regarding the creation of new TLDs. The first was
the 2011 approval of ICM Registry's application for .xxx, a sponsored TLD for
the adult entertainment industry.'56 The second was the approval of the gTLD
Program,'57 which could result in over 1100 new TLDs'
1. Approving .xxx
Although the Department of Commerce oversaw ICANN during the years of
the MOU/JPA, the creation of the .xxx within ICANN languished.'59 ICM Reg-
istry had originally applied for the .xxx TLD during the 2000 proof of concept
program."6 Indeed, at the time of the proof of concept expansion, several ap-
plicants included either ".xxx" or "dot-sex" among their suggested new do-
mains,' 6' although neither adult-oriented TLD was accepted by.'62 Critics raised
First Amendment arguments for rejecting .xxx, claiming that the domain
would make censorship much easier.'63
In 2004, ICM Registry sought approval of the .xxx TLD during the spon-
154 See discussion supra Part III.A.
155 See discussion supra Part III.A.
156 Richards & Calvert, supra note 142, at 538.
157 Approved Board Resolutions Singapore, ICANN (June 20, 2011),
http://commcns.org/Xe I HEU.
158 Kevin Murphy, It's Reveal Day and There Are 1,930 New gTLD Bids, DOMAIN INCITE
(June 13, 2012, 2:45 AM), http://commcns.org/WbOSyn.
159 See Richards & Calvert, supra note 142, at 531.
16o gTLD Background Information, supra note 121; see also Richards & Calvert, supra
note 142, at 532-33.
161 See TLD Applications Lodged, ICANN, supra note 139.
162 See id.
163 See Richards & Calvert, supra note 142, at 533.
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sored TLD application window.'" ICM Registry defined its sponsored com-
munity as "the responsible online adult-entertainment community" and decided
that the International Foundation for Online Responsibility ("IFFOR") would
serve as its sponsoring organization.'65 While the application was given tenta-
tive approval, it was quickly sidelined after the Department of Commerce re-
ceived a wave of critical pushback." At the same time, ICANN began receiv-
ing more and more complaints from members of its Governmental Advisory
Council ("GAC") who urged ICANN to allow more governments to weigh in
on the .xxx decision. 6' In addition to the GAC criticisms, the adult entertain-
ment industry joined critics of .xxx in expressing to ICANN that the ICM Reg-
istry application overstated its support from the adult entertainment industry.'68
As a result of the Board of Director's concern over actual community sup-
port for .xxx and GAC's continued opposition to the TLD, ICM Registry's
application began to languish.'69 In March of 2007, the Board formally rejected
the application."'
ICM Registry appealed this decision through ICANN's Independent Review
Process ("IRP").' In a 2010 non-binding arbitral opinion, the IRP panel found
that, in rejecting ICM Registry's application in 2007, the Board had violated its
documented policies." 2 Although the decision was non-binding, ICANN ex-
plored its options in light of the panel decision."3 In reaction to the arbitral de-
cision and despite the increasingly significant public, governmental, and spon-
sored community opposition to .xxx, the Board decided to move forward in its
164 Id. at 534.
'65 Id.; see ICANN, CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF ICM'S INVOLVEMENT WITH ICANN AS
OF 31 MARCH 2011, at 1 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/SQWSGv.
166 Richards & Calvert, supra note 142, at 534-35 (describing letter campaigns from
conservative U.S. organizations).
167 See ICANN, CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF ICM'S INVOLVEMENT WITH ICANN AS OF
31 MARCH 2011, supra note 165, at 2.
168 See id. at 2.; see also Richards & Calvert, supra note 142, at 536.
169 ICANN, CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF ICM'S INVOLVEMENT WITH ICANN AS OF 31
MARCH 2011. supra note 165, at 2-3.
170 Id. at 2.
"7 See ICANN, DRAFT RATIONALE FOR APPROVING REGISTRY AGREEMENT WITH ICM'S
FOR XXX sTLD 4-6 (Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/XH6WQ8. It is
worth noting that even though the IRP allows an aggrieved party to challenge an ICANN
Board decision, ICANN is under no obligation to adhere to the IRP decision; the decision is
merely a recommendation. ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES
AND Nos. Art. IV § 3 (Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://commcns.orgfWKYsF2. The IRP
really does not provide much of a remedy.
172 ICM Registry, LLC v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Nos., ICDR Case No.
50 117 T 00224 08, 152 (Int'l Ctr. Dispute Resolution Feb. 19 2010), available at
http://commcns.org/l ICi5qn.
173 See ICANN, DRAFT RATIONALE FOR APPROVING REGISTRY AGREEMENT WITH ICM's
FOR .XXX sTLD, supra note 171, at 6.
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consideration of a registry agreement with ICM Registry for the .xxx TLD. '74
The decision to move forward with .xxx opened a round of public comments
on the registry agreement. Notably, a significant number of comments ques-
tioned ICM's support within the adult entertainment community.'75 The GAC
maintained its refusal to support the .xxx domain, which led to a conflict with
the Board.' Pursuant to ICANN Bylaws,'" the Board issued its reasons for
rejecting the GAC's advice7 . and approved the new .xxx TLD' 79
The opposition's condemnation was quick. NTIA Administrator Lawrence
Strickling said in a statement, "We are disappointed that ICANN ignored the
clear advice of governments worldwide, including the U.S .... This decision
goes against the global public interest, and it will open the door to more Inter-
net blocking by governments and undermine the stability and security of the
Internet."'8° In addition, the adult entertainment industry maintains that it does
not support the .xxx TLD.'8' Governments in Asia indicated that Administrator
Strickling's fears were coming to fruition and promised to block the .xxx
TLD.1
82
In addition to these issues, another problem arose with the .xxx domain. Ac-
cording to ICANN, more than 100,000 reservations were made for second lev-
el domains within .xxx. 83 While this may sound promising, not all of these
registrations were made for productive reasons. Brand owners, universities,
and non-profit organizations rushed to protect their images by defensively pur-
chasing .xxx domains that they may never use. 84 By paying between $200 and
174 See id. at 7. A registry agreement is the contract between ICANN and the TLD opera-
tor; in this case, the TLD operator is ICM Registry. ICANN oversees and enforces its poli-
cies for the DNS under these agreements.
175 See id. at 8.
176 See id. at 8-9.
177 In the event of a conflict between GAC advice and a Board decision, "If no such solu-
tion can be found, the ICANN Board will state in its final decision the reasons why the
Governmental Advisory Committee advice was not followed, and such statement will be
without prejudice to the rights or obligations of Governmental Advisory Committee
ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND Nos., supra note 17 1, art.
XI § 2.l1j-k.
178 See ICANN, DRAFT RATIONALE FOR APPROVING REGISTRY AGREEMENT WITH ICM'S
FOR .XXX STLD,, supra note 171, at 14-18.
179 See id. at I ("The Board has determined to approve the ICM Application and enter a
Registry Agreement with ICM for the .XXX sTLD .... ").
180 Ian Shapira, Coming Soon to a Computer Near you: .xXX, WASH. POST (Mar. 18,
2011), http://commcns.org/S9EC9K.
181 See Richards & Calvert, supra note 142, at 537-38.
182 See id. at 539 (discussing how the governments of India and Saudi Arabia have ex-
pressed that they will block the .xxx TLD).
183 See id. at 538-39 (citation omitted).
184 See Mike Snider, Universities Block Triple-X Domain Names, USA TODAY (Dec. 12,
2011, 7:16 AM), http://commcns.org/IOCfGwD.
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$300 per domain, these organizations sought to block other entities from pur-
chasing one of their trademarks, therefore circumventing any association of
their brand with pornography.'85 These defensive registrations serve no produc-
tive purpose. ICM Registry has been criticized as abusing xxx as a means of
exhorting protection money from brand owners-brand owners could either
pay an expensive fee upfront at the launch of .xxx to reserve their brands or
run the risk of a third party purchasing a .xxx domain that associates their
brand with pornography. 6
Arguably, the addition of .xxx to the root was not in the public interest. As a
sponsored TLD, a large, vocal portion of the community that, in theory, would
use .xxx domains does not in fact support the domain. 7 Several nations would
use the domain as a censorship tool, which would arguably harm the open na-
ture of the Internet. 88 In addition, as highlighted by the defensive registration
land-rush, there is limited productive value in these new .xxx domains. Fur-
thermore, over 400 million adult-oriented websites existed before .xxx was
approved.8 9 Should these websites be expected to abandon their existing do-
mains in .corn and other TLDs and switch to .xxx registrations? This is not
economically rational. °
These harms far outweigh the potential benefits for approving the .xxx do-
main. Indeed, under both the MOU and JPA, approval of the .xxx domain was
denied for many of those reasons. 9' However, under the Affirmation of Com-
mitments-with no formal governmental oversight or possible repercussion-
ICANN approved the .xxx TLD. "' The real beneficiaries of .xxx are not the
185 See Steve Stolfi, Brand Owners Need to Protect Against the .XXX, Bus. INSIDER
(Aug. 22, 2011), http://commcns.org/l31Kz04.
186 Kevin Murphy, YouPom Sues ICANN and ICM Over .XXX, DOMAININCITE (Nov.
16, 2011, 11:41 PM), http://commcns.org/Wj6M08 (Plaintiff Manwin claims that "ICM's
sunrise period amounted to extortion and that ICANN willfully created a monopoly by
agreeing to a registry contract with presumptive renewal but no price caps").
'87 See Richards & Calvert, supra note 142, at 536-38 (citations omitted).
188 Cf. AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 17 ("The Internet is a transformative
technology that will continue to empower people around the globe.. . and enable the free
and unfettered flow of information").
189 ICANNgTLD Hearing, supra note 120, at 73 (statement of Steve DelBianco, Execu-
tive Director, NetChoice).
190 See Grant Gross, Senators, Critics Question ICANN's Generic TLD Plan, COM-
PUTERWORLD (Dec. 8, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://commcns.org/U4gVQ0. "If Marriott.hotel and
Marriott.corn were the same site, they would be redundant, and if they are different, 'it's
simply confusing' . . . . The [gTLD] plan creates 'a profusion of new things to protect, with-
out creating additional value because there remains only one Marriott."' Id. (discussing
testimony of Esther Dyson, founding Chairwoman of ICANN before the Senate Commerce,
Science & Transportation Committee).
191 See discussion supra Part III.B.
192 AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 17.
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adult entertainment community, but ICM Registry'93 and ICANN.'94
As NTIA Administrator Larry Strickling pointed out, the decision to ap-
prove the .xxx TLD, "goes against the global public interest."'95 ICANN's de-
cision to approve directly violates the Affirmation of Commitments."9 How-
ever, as there are no enforcement mechanisms within the Affirmation, there is
little that can be done to remedy such a decision, even if it violates the Af-
firmation.
2. The gTLD Program
If the addition of a single new TLD has the potential to cause substantial
harm, an unbridled expansion could have unknown repercussions. While the
.xxx decision differs greatly from ICANN's latest round of expansion of the
TLD universe, the struggle between the Board of Directors, the GAC, and in-
tellectual property owners is nothing new to ICANN observers. It is the shear
scope of this latest round of expansion-effectively, its unprecedented lack of
scope-that raises concerns and highlights the need for some sort of check on
ICANN's decision-making.'97
a. A Brief History of the Program
In 2005, the Generic Names Supporting Organization ("GNSO"), the
ICANN body responsible for the policies related to gTLDs, unanimously ap-
proved a policy development process to determine how ICANN should add
new gTLDs to the universe of domain names. 9 In September of 2007, the
GNSO released 19 recommendations for how new gTLDs should be consid-
193 Kevin Murphy, How Much Money Will ICM Make From .XXX Blocks?, DOMAIN
INCITE (Sept. 13, 2011, 12:57 PM), http://commcns.org/W2Xiby (estimating $3.24 million
in revenue if there are 20,000 defensive registrations during the Sunrise B period).
194 See ICANN, XXX REGISTRY AGREEMENT art. VII §7.2(c) (Mar. 31, 2011), available
at http://commcns.org/UTfssT (ICANN is to receive $2.00 for each domain registered or
transferred to the .xxx domain). This is a high fee compared to other sponsored TLD regis-
try agreements. See ICANN, MOBI REGISTRY AGREEMENT art. VII §7.2(b) (amended Mar.
27, 2007), available at http://commcns.org/SQZ2Gf (ICANN is to receive between $0.15
and $0.75 per each domain registered or transferred to the dot-mobi domain, depending on
the average price of registration fees); ICANN, ASIA REGISTRY AGREEMENT amend. I
(June 22, 2010), available at http://commcns.org/Wj70nP (ICANN is to receive $0.50 per
each domain registered or transferred to the dot-asia domain).
195 Shapira, supra note 180.
196 See AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 17, 3.
197 Letter from Daniel L. Jaffe, Grp. Exec. Vice President, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, to
Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Sec'y for Commc'n and Info., U.S. Dep't of Commerce
(May 7, 2012), available at www.ana.net/getfile/1 7547.
198 Approved Board Resolutions Singapore, supra note 157.
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ered and forwarded them to the Board of Directors.'" ICANN staff began to
examine the possibility of implementing the GNSO's recommendations into a
program to introduce new gTLDs.2  At a June 2008 Board meeting, the Board
adopted the GNSO's recommendations and instructed staff to create an appli-
cant guidebook.2 '
The 2008 approval led to a flurry of studies, reports, drafts of the applicant
guidebook, and rounds of public comments on practically every document re-
leased for the next three years. This process culminated in June 2011, when the
ICANN Board approved (what was believed to be) a final draft of the guide-
book and began a public awareness campaign to inform the non-ICANN par-
ticipating public about the new program.2"2 ICANN would begin accepting ap-
plications for new gTLDs on January 12, 2012.203
b. The GAC and the Board
Before final approval took place in June 2011, the GAC sought to clarify its
role in not only the gTLD program's development process, but also in the ul-
timate decisions to approve new gTLDs." 4 As a result, the GAC created a
"scorecard" identifying ICANN's approach to various issues that the GAC re-
quired to be addressed before final approval of the gTLD program. 5 Relevant
issues included the GAC's role in reviewing controversial or "sensitive
strings," rights protections for intellectual property owners, and the economic
impacts of the program.0 6 ICANN and the GAC worked to address the GAC's
concerns; however, ICANN ultimately approved the gTLD program without
addressing all of the GAC's identified issues.20 7
The ICANN Board ignored the advice of the GAC on several important pub-
lic policy issues. First, the Board included provisions in the gTLD Applicant
Guidebook allowing for the vertical integration of registries and registrars, ef-
199 Id.
200 See id.
201 See Letter from Heather Dryden, Interim Chair, Governmental Advisory Comm., to
Peter Dengate Thrush, Chairman of the Bd., ICANN (Nov. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Dryden
Letter], available at http://commcns.org/Va5EjH.
202 ICANN GAC, GAC INDICATIVE SCORECARD ON NEW GTLD OUTSTANDING ISSUES
LISTED IN THE GAC CARTAGENA COMMUNIQUt (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/W2XpnD.
203 Id.
204 See Dryden Letter, supra note 201.
205 GAC Indicative scorecard on new gTLD outstanding issues listed in the GAC Cart-
agena Communiqui, supra note 202.
206 Id.
207 See ICANN, RATIONALE: REMAINING AREAS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ICANN's
BOARD AND GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NEW GTLD PROGRAM (June 20, 2011), available at http://commcns.org/XhCUAs.
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fectively lifting a prior restriction on such activity. °8 This raises important anti-
trust and competition concerns,2" and will require ICANN to perform antitrust
reviews to ensure that these vertically integrated registry-registrars are not
harming competition?' 0 Given ICANN's history of poor enforcement of its
existing policies against registries and registrars, it is difficult to imagine how
ICANN will perform these rigorous antitrust reviews to ensure the competi-
tiveness of the market for domain names."' The removal of the vertical integra-
tion constraint has the potential to harm competition, which would violate the
Affirmation of Commitments"' and place a heavy burden on government en-
forcement agencies to perform ICANN's task.
ICANN also approved the gTLD Program without including important intel-
lectual property rights protection mechanisms that were recommended by the
GAC and an ICANN commissioned body called the Implementation Review
Team (IRT"). One of the strongest protections recommended by the IRT
was a Globally Protected Marks List that would protect famous, internationally
registered trademarks at both the top and second levels of new gTLDs 4 How-
ever, ICANN rejected this recommendation and removed it from all future dis-
cussions. '
The Board did adopt the IRT's recommendation for establishing a Trade-
mark Clearing House where gTLDs can check new registrants against a central
database containing owner-registered trademarks. 6 The GAC recommended
that new gTLDs utilize the Trademark Clearing House beyond their initial
208 See ICANN, GTLD APPLICANT GUIDEBOOK § 1.2.1 (Jan. 11, 2012), available at
http://commcns.org/W9fSMe ("Registrar Cross-Ownership-ICANN-accredited registrars
are eligible to apply for a gTLD").
209 See Letter from Larry Strickling, Assistant Sec'y of Commerce, to Peter Dengate-
Thrush, Chairman of the Bd. of Dirs., ICANN (June 16, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/l0Cg8Lj (forwarding letter from the U.S. Department of Justice Anti-
trust Division to ICANN).
210 See Letter from Rod Beckstrom, President and CEO, ICANN, to Gerard de Graaf,
Dir., European Comm'n Info. Soc'y and Media Directorate and European Comm'n Direc-
torate Gen. for Competition 1 (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/WKYPzk.
211 See Leibowitz Letter, supra note 16, at I ("Currently, ICANN is ill-equipped to han-
dle the contract enforcement for the 22 existing gTLDs and several hundred accredited reg-
istrars. In particular, ICANN... has failed to close contractual loopholes.., and needs to
implement a more rigorous enforcement program").
212 AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 17, 9.3.
213 ICANN, RATIONALE: REMAINING AREAS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ICANN's BOARD
AND GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW
GTLD PROGRAM, supra note 207, at 1-4.
214 See ICANN, FINAL REPORT ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION IN NEW GTLDS 16 (May 29,
2009), available at http://commcns.org/XH7SnL.
215 See Paul McGrady, ICANN Board: You Got It Right. Then You Got It Wrong. Now,
Get It Right Again, CICRLEID (Mar. 1, 2011 11:51 AM), http://commcns.org/Uxt4f9.




launch."' The Board also rejected this recommendation, which lead to the cur-
rent requirement that gTLDs are only to use the Trademark Clearing House
during their initial launches.2 The program was approved, however, without
addressing pertinent internal dilemmas. Such issues include additional dis-
agreements between the Board and the GAC regarding the standards for the
burden of proof in trademark dispute mechanisms, as well as the special pro-
tections for certain intergovernmental organizations. 9 ICANN's failure to ful-
ly address intellectual property protections before implementing the gTLD
Program may lead to vocal criticism that would only draw attention to
ICANN's disregard for governmental advice.22°
ICANN further disregarded the advice of the GAC in implementing a series
of recommendations made by law enforcement designed to assist law enforce-
ment's efforts at policing fraud and illegal activity on the Internet.2 ' Law en-
forcement asked ICANN in 2009 to implement several changes to its agree-
ments with its accredited registrars that would make investigating cybercrimes
easier.222 Although some of these recommendations were included in the gTLD
Program, 223 ICANN has slow-walked incorporating these changes into its ex-
isting agreements, which has hampered the investigation of today's cyber-
crime. 24 Almost three years later, the negotiations over these important public
policy and safety issues are at a standstill.225 However, without a means to truly
pressure ICANN to bring the registrars to the table to negotiate, the GAC and
governments worldwide are seemingly without a means to ensure that ICANN
implements these consumer and public safety recommendations.226
217 ICANN GAC, GAC INDICATIVE SCORECARD ON NEW GTLD OUTSTANDING ISSUES
LISTED IN THE GAC CARTAGENA COMMUNIQUI, supra note 202, at 7.
218 See GTLD APPLICANT GUIDEBOOK, supra note 208, § 5.4.1.
219 ICANN, RATIONALE: REMAINING AREAS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ICANN's BOARD
AND GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW
GTLD PROGRAM, supra note 207, at 1-4.
220 See infra § III.B.2.c.
221 See Senators Press ICANN on Generic Top-Level Domains, MASHABLE TECH (Dec. 8,
2011), http://commcns.org/U4hitP.
222 ICANN GAC, GAC COMMUNIQU-DAKAR § III (Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/l I CiUzi.
223 ICANNgTLD Hearing, supra note 120, at 3 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chair,
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop.) ("ICANN's new Applicant Guidebook also includes pro-
tections that the law enforcement community believes will help take into account some of
the cyber security concerns raised by the gTLD proposal").
224 ICANN GAC, GAC COMMUNIQU, supra note 222, § III ("To date, none of the rec-
ommendations have been implemented, and the risks remain"); see also Leibowitz Letter,
supra note 16, at 4-5 (discussing law enforcement's proposed changes and weakness in the
current WHOIS system).
225 Kieren McCarthy, RAA Talks Collapse: What Now?, DOT-NXT (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://commcns.org/Wj7zhz.
226 Cf. AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS, supra note 17 (lacking any enforcement provi-
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Had ICANN fully addressed policy concerns over intellectual property pro-
tection and public safety before it launched the Program, it would have more
likely demonstrated that it was capable of protecting such important issues of
public interest. By not fully addressing these issues, ICANN only raises ques-
tions about its capability and the need for a stronger governmental role in order
to ensure that such issues are fully addressed before new DNS policies are im-
plemented.
c. Negative Reactions to the gTLD Program
Stakeholders have been divided as to whether new gTLDs were warranted
or even necessary since 1999, when ICANN first discussed expanding the
number of gTLDs.227 However, as the 2011 decision on the gTLD expansion
program came and went, criticism of the program and ICANN itself continued
to grow.
Perhaps the first challenge came from NTIA. Mere days before the ICANN
Board was to meet and vote on launching the gTLD program, NTIA released a
Further Notice of Inquiry related to the IANA Functions Contract, which had
been performed by ICANN for almost ten years. 2" NTIA, in discussing com-
ments from its original request for comments on the IANA Functions Contract,
noted that some commenters "expressed concerns about transparency and ac-
countability of the current contractor's decision-making." '229 More telling of
NTIA's concerns over ICANN came in its response to a question related to the
administration of country code TLDs ("ccTLDs") by IANA.23° NTIA discussed
commenters' concerns regarding new gTLDs and how they should be intro-
duced "in the interest and for the benefit of the global Internet community."23'
To resolve this, NTIA proposed "a requirement that delegation requests for
new gTLDs include documentation demonstrating how the string proposed
reflects consensus among relevant stakeholders" that would ensure that new
gTLDs were "in the global public interest." '232
Many saw this as NTIA reacting to ICANN's decision to approve xxx,233
sions).
227 See ICANN INTERIM REPORT, supra note 133.
228 IANA Further NOI, supra note 118, at 34,659.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 34,661-62.
231 Id. at 34,661.
232 Id. at 34,662.
233 Kevin Murphy, NTIA Says ICANN "Does Not Meet the Requirements" for 1ANA
Renewal, DOMAIN INCITE (Mar. 10, 2012, 3:21 PM), http://commcns.org/S9Gxv4 ("This
demand is a way to prevent another controversy such as the approval of xxx a year ago,
which the Governmental Advisory Committee objected to on the grounds that it was not the
'the global public interest."').
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which NTIA had previously stated was not in the global public interest."' With
the real possibility of hundreds of new gTLDs, the requirement was seen as a
way for governments to prevent new gTLDs that could be as controversial as
.xxx.233 ICANN vehemently opposed this proposed requirement.236 Yet, despite
this threat to ICANN's decision-making authority, 237 and the U.S. govern-
ment's apparent disapproval of ICANN's decisions, ICANN approved the
gTLD program days after NTIA released its proposed changes to the IANA
Functions Contract.
238
The ANA's critique of the gTLD Program caught the attention of other or-
ganizations and governmental entities that disagreed with ICANN's decisions.
A large group of trade associations and businesses formed the Coalition for
Responsible Internet Domain Oversight ("CRIDO") to advocate for changes to
the gTLD Program.239 CRIDO petitioned the Department of Commerce to have
ICANN postpone the launch of the gTLD Program because "ICANN's deci-
sion was not made in the public interest, does not promote consumer trust, and
does not benefit the public, as required in the Affirmation of Commitments...
,240 The coalition further argued that the gTLD program would burden brand
holders, confuse consumers, and create greater risks in cyber security and
online fraud.24" '
Prominent government stakeholders soon echoed CRIDO's criticisms of the
gTLD expansion decisions. One of the first vocal critics was FTC Chairman
Jon Leibowitz.242 During a congressional hearing, the Chairman, in response to
a question regarding fraud and consumer deception on the Internet, responded
that the FTC was "very, very concerned that this roll-out of new gTLDs has the
potential to be a disaster for consumers and for businesses." '243 Following up on
this statement, the FTC sent a letter to ICANN criticizing ICANN for moving
234 See Shapira, supra note 180.
235 See Kevin Murphy, ICANN Fights Government gTLD Power Grab, DOMAIN INCITE
(July 22, 2011, 7:08:32 PM), http://commcns.org/UxtjXL.
236 Id. ("Cutting to the very heart of Obama administration internet governance policy,
ICANN has told the National Telecommunications and Information Administration that its
recent proposals would 'undermine the very principle of the multi-stakeholder model."').
237 Id. ("ICANN chief Rod Beckstrom says that the NTIA's proposal would "replace"
the "intensive multi-stakeholder deliberation" that created the newly approved Applicant
Guidebook").
238 See Approved Board Resolutions Singapore, supra note 157.
239 Coalition for Responsible Internet Domain Oversight (CRIDO), ANA,
http://commcns.org/1hIfOI (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (listing coalition members).
240 Letter from CRIDO to Hon. John Bryson, U.S. Sec'y. of Commerce (Nov. 10, 2011),
available at http://commcns.org/XhyYzx.
241 Id.
242 Kieren McCarthy, FTC 'very, very concerned' About New gTLD Program, DOT-NXT
(Dec. 7, 2011), http://commcns.org/l ICjbCt.
243 Id.
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forward with the gTLD Program before it had taken measures to protect con-
sumers online.2" Without improving its policies and enforcement efforts before
launching the gTLD Program, the FTC warned that "Fraudsters will be able to
register misspellings of businesses, including financial institutions, in each of
the new gTLDs, create copycat websites, and obtain sensitive consumer data
with relative ease before shutting down the site and launching a new one."245
The Commission noted that these concerns were not unknown to ICANN
and were repeatedly raised during deliberations of the new gTLD Program.246
ICANN had failed to properly respond to all of the issues that were raised. In
particular, it failed to implement certain obligations in order to enhance the
new gTLD program and did not establish "adequate solutions to widely docu-
mented problems in the existing gTLD marketplace." '247 The Commission re-
quested that ICANN implement a pilot program for gTLD expansion in order
to improve its enforcement of policies that allow intellectual property owners
and law enforcement to police the Internet.248
While much of the criticism of the gTLD program has come from the pri-
vate sector, the public sector soon realized that the gTLD Program placed its
own brands at risk.249 A coalition of intergovernmental organizations ("IGOs"),
including the United Nations ("UN"), the International Monetary Fund
("IMF"), and the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), requested that ICANN
"make provision for a targeted exclusion of third party registrations of the
names and acronyms of IGOs both at the top and second level" during the
gTLD Program.25 Their concerns were the same as those of many private sec-
tor critics: "the increased potential for the misleading registration and use of
IGO names and acronyms in the domain name system under ICANN's signifi-
cant expansion plans."25'
Just as required of private sector brand holders, these IGOs would be ex-
pected to expend resources in order to police the Internet to ensure that their
brands were not being misused.252 Such resources would be better spend on
244 Leibowitz Letter, supra note 16, at 3-5.
245 Id. at 5.
246 See id. at 6 ("Stakeholders urged ICANN to address the potential for malicious con-
duct and implement certain consumer protection safeguards before authorizing the launch of
the new gTLD program.").
247 Id. at 7.
248 See id. at 6.
249 Diane Bartz, International Groups Want Off Internet Name Expansion, REUTERS
(Dec. 13, 2011), http://commcns.org/13ILX2T.
250 Open Letter from Intergovernmental Orgs. on the Expansion of Generic Top Level
Domains to Stephen D. Crocker, Chairman of the Bd. of Dirs., ICANN, and Rod Beck-
strom, President and CEO, ICANN I (Dec. 13, 2011), available at
http://commcns.org/U4hvNA.
251 Id.
252 Id. ("Abusive registration of IGO names and acronyms harms these causes. It also
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productive activities, such as peacekeeping operations, assisting refugees, or
disaster relief. Precedent exists for ICANN's protection of IGO names and ac-
ronyms. During the gTLD Program policy formulation, ICANN chose to pro-
tect only two IGOs-the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee." 3 However, ICANN punted on making any deci-
sion to protect the rest of the IGO community.25 ' It simply referred the matter
to the GNSO and the GAC in order to provide the Board with "policy advice"
regarding protections for IGOs.255
d. The Commerce Department Responds?
Due to the shortcomings of the Affirmation of Commitments, there is little
that the U.S. government can do to alter ICANN's decision making. Petitions
to the Department of Commerce by organizations and politicians alike have
done little to influence any changes to the current gTLD Program.
In early January 2012, shortly before the launch of the gTLD Program,
NTIA sent a letter to ICANN, noting the "tremendous concern" of industry
regarding the Program.256 NTIA made three requests of ICANN: (1) find a way
to minimize the perceived need for defensive gTLD registrations; (2) promptly
implement policies to assist law enforcement and protect consumers; and (3)
better educate stakeholders about the gTLD program.5 7
ICANN seemingly responded to NTIA's request. In response to the "per-
ceived need for defensive applications," ICANN initiated a public comment
period on February 6, 2012258 in order to determine the "sources of this percep-
tion and how it can be addressed." '259 However, the comment period launched
imposes a serious enforcement burden on IGOs, which . .. divert[s] their public resources..
. [It is] incumbent on ICANN as the mandating agency of the domain name system to im-
plement appropriate policy measures to help mitigate these harms").
253 See APPLICANT GUIDEBOOK, supra note 208 § 2.2.1.2.3.
254 See Letter from Stephen D. Crocker, Chairman of the Bd. of Dirs., ICANN, and Rod
Beckstrom, President and CEO, ICANN, to Heather Dryden, Chair, Gov't Advisory Comm.,
ICANN, and Stephane van Gelder, Chair, GNSO Council, ICANN 1-2 (Mar. 11, 2012),
available at http://commcns.org/UTfVLI.
255 See id. With new gTLDs potentially coming online in early 2013, as of November
2012, ICANN had yet to decide how, if at all, it will protect IGO names. See Kevin Murphy,
ICANN Sets Deadline to Sort Out Olympic Shambles, DOMAIN INCITE (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://commcns.org/Va5TLP; Kevin Murphy, Secret ICANN Briefing Fuels IGO New
gTLDs Debate, DOMAIN INCITE (Sept. 10, 2012), http://commcns.org/Va5WXT.
256 Letter from Lawrence E. Strickling, Adm'r, NTIA, to Dr. Stephen D. Crocker,
Chairman, Bd. of Dirs., ICANN 1 (Jan. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Strickling Letter], available at
http://commcns.org/V8vJvK.
257 Id.
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in the middle of the application window.2" Any substantive change to the
gTLD program in the middle of the application period would likely give rise to
applicants claiming unfairness and inequitable conduct by ICANN. The com-
ment period seemed little more than an empty gesture by ICANN to placate
NTIA.
2 61
With little ability to persuade ICANN to address its concerns, NTIA's letter,
which echoed many of the FTC's concerns,262 may be a fruitless exercise. Be-
cause of the Affirmation of Commitments' lack of enforcement power, there is
little that NTIA can do to ensure that Internet users are protected from
ICANN's actions or its lack of action.
263
NTIA caught ICANN's attention another way: through the LANA Functions
Contract. ICANN currently fills the role as the LANA Functions contractor."
In late 2011, NTIA initiated a Request for Proposals seeking a contractor to
fulfill the requirements of the JANA Functions contract."' The solicitation con-
tained new requirements, previously unknown to the administration of LANA,
which NTIA hoped would address international concerns with ICANN and its
administration of the DNS.266 Specific to the gTLD Program, under the new
260 See Approved Board Resolutions Singapore, supra note 157 (New gTLD application
window opened on January 12, 2012, and closed on April 12, 2012); cf. Defensive Applica-
tions for New gTLDs, supra note 258 (Comment period opened Feb. 6, 2012, and closed
Feb. 27, 2012).
261 Indeed, in an October 2012 letter, NTIA reiterated its concerns with how ICANN
would protect trademarks in the new gTLD program. Protection mechanisms within the
program, long promised by ICANN, have yet to be finalized and ICANN has not listened to
recommendations for additional reasonable and cost-effective protections suggested by the
intellectual property community. Strickling Letter, supra note 256, at 1-2.
262 Compare id. (requesting that ICANN complete negotiations to assist law enforce-
ment, improve WHOIS compliance and policy making, and improve its contractual compli-
ance activities) with Leibowitz Letter, supra note 16, at 1-5, 8 (discussing law enforce-
ment's use of and problems with WHOIS and challenges with ICANN's contractual compli-
ance efforts).
263 See ICANN, PROGRESS REPORT - NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION
AGREEMENT (Mar. 1, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/l02q3ng. Only five of law
enforcement's recommendations have agreed-upon language for the newest version of
ICANN's agreement with its accredited registrars. These recommendations were first issued
in 2009 and are designed to improve law enforcement's capability to protect consumers by
investigating fraud and other illegal activity.
264 Press Release, Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin, Notice - Extension of the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions Contract (Mar. 10, 2012), available at
http://commcns.org/UxtlJx.
265 IANA SOLICITATION No. SA1301-12-RP-IANA AMENDMENT 0001 § C.1 (Nov. 17,
2011) [hereinafter IANA AMENDMENT 0001 ], available at http://commcns.org/UTg3Lg.
266 Press Release, Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin, Notice - Cancelled Internet As-
signed Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions - Request for Proposal (RFP) SA1301-12-RP-
IANA (Mar. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Cancelled IANA Functions], available at
http://commcns.org/W9guRW ("Based on the input received from stakeholders around the
world, NTIA added new requirements ... including ... provisions reflecting heightened
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statement of work, the IANA Functions contractor would need to ensure that
ICANN followed its own processes in delegating the new gTLD to the root,
that stakeholders were permitted to weigh in on the gTLD's delegation, and
that the delegation was supportive of the global public interest.267 Such re-
quirements appeared to be a response to the .xxx fiasco that left several gov-
ernments unhappy with ICANN's decision. 68
After evaluating the proposals submitted, NTIA canceled the solicitation and
announced that none of the submissions had met the solicitation's require-
ments. 69 The rejection of ICANN's bid for the IANA contract left the organi-
zation, and its insular community, in a state of shock."' Although NTIA reis-
sued the solicitation27" ' with some alterations, the new requirements remain .
72
NTIA has sent a clear message: the public interest must be fully accounted for
when implementing DNS policy. This message aside, NTIA should realize that
the Affirmation of Commitments is insufficient and that a greater role for gov-
ernment in DNS policymaking is needed to ensure that the public interest is
truly accounted for.
V. CONCLUSION
While private sector coordination of the DNS was always a noble goal,
ICANN's handling of gTLDs-perhaps one of the most important aspects of
managing the DNS-has demonstrated the organization's inability to operate
without some form of governmental oversight. As the gTLD program moves
forward, should problems arise that could have been addressed through the
ignored advice of governments via the GAC, ICANN may face a serious threat
to its role in the DNS. The failure of such a large and public program may be
all that is needed for a transfer of ICANN's powers to a wholly government-
run DNS management system. 73
respect for local country laws, and a series of consultation and reporting requirements to
increase transparency and accountability to the international community.").
267 TANA AMENDMENT 0001, supra note265, § C.2.9.2d This provision was included in
the newest contract. TANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT, 2012, supra note 110, § C.2.9.2d.
268 See Murphy, supra note 233.
269 Cancelled TANA Functions, supra note 267.
270 See Kieren McCarthy, ICANN Had No Idea IANA Rejection Was Coming, DOT-NXT
(Mar. 10, 2012), http://commcns.org/Wj8tuh; Kevin Murphy, ICANN to Issue Update on
IANA Contract, DOMAIN INCITE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://commcns.org/U4hQ2E.
271 Press Release, Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin. Request for Proposal for TANA
Functions Contract, (Apr. 17, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/Va67m6.
272 See Kevin Murphy, US Reopens IANA Contract Re-bid, DOMAIN INCITE (Apr. 17,
2012, 11:04:14 AM), http://commcns.org/Wj8AGr; TANA FUNCTIONS CONTRACT, 2012,
supra note 110, § C.2.9.2d.
273 See Michael Joseph Gross, World War 3.0, VANITY FAIR (May 2012), available at
http://commcns.org/VMMIwI.
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Governmental Participation in DNS Management
Throughout the history of the DNS, government has always played a role in
overseeing the private sector. Indeed, it is hard to imagine such a multi-
stakeholder model without government involvement. The public-private part-
nership model should continue. While ICANN promotes itself as an organiza-
tion dedicated to bottom-up consensus making, the organization seemingly
only responds to those who participate-and even then only to certain inter-
ests. As a result, the vast majority of consumers, organizations, and businesses
who rely on the Internet and the DNS, but have never heard of ICANN, are left
out of the process. Such entities could best be represented through stronger
government involvement in ICANN." 4 If participation truly represented all
Internet users, perhaps the many organizations that were adversely affected by
the gTLD Program would have voiced their concerns before the gTLD Pro-
gram was approved. A larger or more formally structured role for government
within ICANN would make ICANN more democratic and more responsive to
concerns.
Reinstituting some means of governmental oversight could be accomplished
in one of two ways. The first, and by far more internationally controversial,
involves the Department of Commerce leveraging its contractual control over
the physical root server system and IANA to force ICANN to negotiate a new
Affirmation of Commitments that contains reasonable means to enforce
ICANN's promises. While feasible, this path would only give ammunition to
ICANN's critics who claim that the organization is already beholden to the
United States. The second way is to strengthen and formally structure the role
of the GAC within ICANN in order to give the GAC more power within the
ICANN structure. Such power would come from providing the GAC a seat on
the ICANN Board of Directors or by reducing the Board's ability to circum-
vent the GAC's advice. The GAC representative to the Board would thereby
represent the GAC, and not his or her individual country's interest; likewise,
the interests of the GAC would be kept in check by the other Board members,
much like a minority shareholder's board seat in a closely held corporation.
Additionally, or even alternatively, the GAC's role could be more structured,
such as by providing it a role in the policy making process within the GNSO
rather than its current direct path of advising the Board. " If ICANN were to
proactively take such steps, it would send a strong message to its critics that
the organization truly is a multi-stakeholder body that responds to the needs of
the global community it serves and learns from its previous shortcomings.
274 This position has been argued before from within ICANN, and unfortunately, re-
jected. Jonathan Weinberg, Governments, Privatization, and "Privatization ": ICANN and
the GAC, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 189, 197 (2011).
275 A more structured and participatory role would hopefully lead to less dysfunction.
Contra id. at 218.
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Such action would likewise be a strong counter argument to recent interna-
tional calls for a purely government-run Internet. A more participatory defined
role for government within the management of the DNS could only improve
the stability of the Internet's naming system and ensure that all users' inter-
ests-and not just those of vested stakeholders-are accounted for.
